

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 CAIRO 04781 101031Z

12

ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

----- 014207

O 101000Z APR 76

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1879

S E C R E T CAIRO 4781

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, LE, SY, EG, US

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM SADAT

REF: (A) STATE 081421, (B) CAIRO 4541

1. VP MUBAREK SUMMONED ME TO ABDIN THIS MORNING. SAID HE HAD LATE LAST NIGHT RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM SADAT FOR YOU. ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF MESSAGE FOLLOWS:

2. QUOTE WITH RESPECT TO THE MESSAGE RECEIVED ON APRIL 6, AND THE SUGGESTION THEREIN OF COMBINED FORCES FROM THE DIFFERENT LEBANESE FACTIONS, THE PRESIDENT OF COURSE APPRECIATES ANY SUGGESTION THAT MIGHT FACILITATE A RESOLUTION OF THE (LEBANESE) PROBLEM. THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES, HOWEVER, THAT THIS CONCEPT IS NOT PRACTICAL. IT IS LIKELY TO CAUSE IN THE END MANY MORE COMPLICATIONS, SINCE THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS MAY BE EXPECTED TO OPPOSE EACH OTHER. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF COOPERATION AMONG KATA'IB, JUMBLATT'S FORCES, FATAH AND SAIQA.

THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES IT WOULD BE MUCH MORE PRACTICAL TO ORGANIZE A SYMBOLIC FORCE FROM NEUTRAL ARAB STATES, WHICH HE BELIEVES WOULD HAVE A SALUTARY INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION. ADDITIONALLY,

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 CAIRO 04781 101031Z

THE SUGGESTION (OF A MIXED FORCE OF LEBANESE FACTIONS)

COULD LEAD TO SYRIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PROVIDE COVER FOR IT. THUS, IF IT FAILED, THE SYRIANS MIGHT CLAIM THAT IF MATTERS HAD BEEN COMPLETELY LEFT TO THEM, THEY COULD SUCCESSFULLY HAVE RESOLVED THE SITUATION. IT WOULD BE A GOOD PRETEXT FOR SYRIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION.

IF THE US WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE A USEFUL AND PRACTICAL SUGGESTION, THE PRESIDENT IS OF THE VIEW THAT IT MIGHT PUT FORWARD THE IDEA OF A SUPERVISORY MILITARY COMMITTEE FROM THE VARIOUS NEUTRAL ARAB STATES. IN THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW, THIS WOULD OFFER A CONSTRUCTIVE POSSIBILITY FOR COOPERATION TO WORK OUT A RESOLUTION TO THE (LEBANESE) PROBLEM. UNQUOTE

3. BY NETRUAL ARAB STATES, ACCORDING TO THE VP, SADAT HAS IN MIND SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, POSSIBLE THE SUDAN. THE CRITERIA SHOULD BE STATES THAT HAVE GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH SYRIA AND LEBANON. (NOTE: THERE WAS NO SUCH SPECIFIC IDENTIFICATION IN SADAT'S MESSAGE.)

4. MUBAREK ALSO ASKED ME ABOUT REPORTS OF SYRIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN MASNAA AND TRIPOLI. TODAY'S PRESS CARRIES REPORTS OF SYRIAN MILITARY MOVES INTO THESE AREAS. I SAID I HAD ALSO SEEN SUCH PRESS REPORTS, BUT HAD NO CONFIRMATION. MUBAREK COMMENTED THAT, IF THIS SYRIAN MILITARY MOVE INTO LEBANON PORTENDS A MORE MASSIVE SYRIAN INTERVENTION, SITUATION WILL GET WORSE. HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW ASAD COULD BE SO SHORTSIGHTED. ASAD ALREADY HAH SYRIAN REGULARS IN LEBANON GARBED IN SAIQA AND PLA UNIFORMS. ACCORDING TO THE VP, 80 PERCENT OF THE SAIQA AND PLA UNITS NOW IN LEBANON CONSIST OF SYRIAN REGULAR TROOPS. ALL OF THE OFFICERS HE CLAIMED, ARE SYRIAN. HE ASKED THAT WE ADVISE HIM OF ANY INFORMATION THAT WE MAY HAVE ON THIS SYRIAN MOVE. IF TRUE, THE PRESIDENT WILL BE VERY DISTRUBED ABOUT IT.

5. THE VP ADDED HE HAD JUST RECEIVED WORD THAT  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 CAIRO 04781 101031Z

SADAT WILL SPEND ANOTHER DAY IN AUSTRIA. THE PRESIDENT WILL NOW NOT RETURN TO CAIRO UNTIL TUESDAY, APRIL 13.  
EILTS

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** COLLECTIVE SECURITY, INTERVENTION, CAT-C, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, CONSORTIUMS, DISSIDENT FACTIO NS, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 10 APR 1976  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** ellisoob  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976CAIRO04781  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** CAIRO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 2  
**Legacy Key:** link1976/newtext/t19760475/aaaacmcy.tel  
**Line Count:** 111  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION NODS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** NODIS  
**Reference:** 76 STATE 81421, 76 CAIRO 4541  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** ellisoob  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 08 JUN 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <08 JUN 2004 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <18 OCT 2004 by ellisoob>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** LOCK1  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MESSAGE FROM SADAT  
**TAGS:** PFOR, MPOL, PSDC, EG, US, SY, LE, (SADAT, ANWAR), (KISSINGER, HENRY A), (MUBARAK, HUSNI)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006